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Abstract: For several years, Latin American foreign policy has shifted between autonomy and 
subordination, observing a conjunctural pragmatic accommodation by decision makers. This article 
examines this topic, based on a conceptual framework that links internal, external and personal elements 
of authors such as James Rosenau, Valerie Hudson, Robert Russell and Juan Tokatlian. The analysis 
takes into account regional differences, the role of powers of different rank such as Brazil, Mexico and 
Colombia to demonstrate the importance of presidentialist emphases and preferences, although some of 
them are more rhetorical than real. The changes and continuities of Latin American foreign policy are 
considered, taking into account various sub-regions, and domestic agendas of interaction with the 
international. The United States continues to be the main reference for the foreign policy of the region. 
However, this power has been losing space that has been filled by countries such as China, India, Japan 
and Russia. The article concludes that Latin American changes are more political, conjunctural and 
pragmatic, and there is a tendency towards the construction of a New Right that is articulated with US 
hegemonic interests. 
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1. Introduction  
There have been changes in the XXI Century in Latin America. Many of them 
are conjectural more than structural and more political than economic. However, such 
transformations vary throughout the region.  In this sense, the article examines the 
changes and continuities of Latin America’s external insertion considering its sub-
regions and agendas. United States continues to portray itself as the main referent of 
foreign policy in the region. However, it has lost grounds, which have been filled by 
countries as China, India, Japan and Russia.   
     Several factors that coincide with the design and practices of Latin American foreign 
policy are observed. Some are external, other internal and other related with personality 
traits of decision makers. In this sense, not only hard capacities of countries will 
influence their external insertion but also ideals, values and beliefs will influence 
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nuances and priorities of a given country on a specific topic. Presidential 
diplomacy, clientelism, and the absence of State policies give a special meaning to 
systemic, conjectural and personal variables. This article aims at answering the 
following questions: Which external, internal and personal elements influence external 
insertion in Latin America? What sub- regional differences are found by country and 
topic?  
     The hypothesis is that the transition Latin America is undergoing is taking the region 
to a new way of international insertion; this by non-traditional actors as cities and 
regions, and from new topics in the international agenda.  In this sense, in the first part a 
conceptual framework is built by reviewing authors as James Rosenau, Valerie Hudson, 
and Russel and Tokatlian. The position of the United States and other power poles in the 
Latin American agenda, the main changes and their impact on a New Multilateralism –
or not, are analyzed. In the second part, the different Latin American sub regions are 
analyzed. Thirdly, the analysis of new understandings of Latin American external 
insertion in regards to topics and actors, as paradiplomacy and strategic inter 
regionalism. Finally, it concludes that the changes in Latin American external insertion 
are more conjunctural than structural and will depend on the guests at the presidential 
house.   
     This article is part of a broader research on Latin American foreign policy. It uses a 
qualitative and deductive methodology, and primary and secondary sources.   
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2. Latin American foreign policy: external, internal and personal factors 
 
A series of elements that affect the direction of external insertion of Latin America are 
found in the analysis. North American, European and Latin American international 
analysts have searched for explanations of the elements and actors that influence 
geographical and theme priorities. Some of analysts identify external, internal and 
personal factors.   
     James Rosenau alludes the way in which the international system is made and how 
countries exercise their influence; for Latin America, the United States constitutes the 
main political and economic reference. Rosenau analyzes systemic, governmental, non-
governmental and idiosyncratic factors.
1
 The first refers to the situation and tendencies 
of the international system. In this sense, the location of the United States and its 
weakening, and the access of powers as China, India and Russia play an important 
role.   
     Furthermore, Valerie Hudson identifies five elements that influence a country’s 
external insertion: individual characteristic, perceptions, society and culture, political 
system and international system. In spite its similarities with Rosenau, the author adds 
perception, culture and political system. In different works, Russell and Tokatlian refer 
to the “Grand Strategy” in the design of foreign policies and highlight five models of 
Latin American foreign insertion, all of which relate with the North American 
hegemonic power. The decade of the ’90 was a period of mass settling, in different 
degrees, to Washington. From the beginning of the XXI century, several countries led 
by Hugo Chavez broadened the space for resistance to American preferences, 
combining ways of settling and opposition. «En América Latina – emphasize Robert 
Russell and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian – la gran estrategia ha sido concebida y practicada 
en una clave singular. Se ha expresado mediante dos lógicas: la aquiescencia y la 
                                                     
1
 See J. ROSENAU, Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy, in J.A. VÁSQUEZ, ed., Classics of 
International Relations, Upper Saddle, NJ, Prentice Hal, 1996, pp. 179-190. 
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autonomía».
2
 These models by Russell and Tokatlian
3
 take particularly into 
consideration a group of permanent, durable and contingent factors: permanent factors 
are size of the countries and location; durable are power, natural resources, identity, and 
the degree of diversification of foreign relations; and contingent factors are political 
orientations and the importance of the country to the United States.
4
 At the same time, 
they point that dichotomous visions need to be overcome since not one country is 
completely settled or opponent.   
     Firstly, in regards to the systemic factors identified by these authors, Trump has 
mentioned the United States as “America First”, showing a different foreign policy. It is 
not an alternative vision of the international order nor a new doctrine or a consistent 
guide of foreign policy. It withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), from 
climate change, from UNESCO and from the global pact on immigration and asylum. 
However, it does affect the Latin American region in topics as migration, safety and 
commerce.  As shown by Lars Schoultz, US policy towards the region has been based 
on the “belief that Latin Americans are an inferior branch of the human race”. This has 
been the case since Monroe Doctrine in 1823.  
     From an unmovable prejudice between white poor and evangelic peasants, Trump 
has built a story or an image where Latin Americans are a source of instability for 
Americans: lack of employment is due to factories moving to Mexico, salary is stagnant 
because of illegal immigration, drugs are made in the homes of Latin American 
families, and worst crimes are by Latin immigrants or Salvadorian gangs.   
     Trump assures that the current commercial policy weakens the country and defends a 
protectionist approach. On the one hand, he states that free-trade agreements have been 
prejudicial for the industry of the United States, as they have derived from massive 
moves. On the other hand, he advocates for stopping the arrival of foreign products by 
                                                     
2
 R. RUSSELL-J.G. TOKATLIAN, América Latina y su gran estrategia: entre la aquiescencia y la 
autonomía in «Revista CIDOB d’afers internacionals», 104, 2013, p. 157. 
3
 See RUSSELL-J.G. TOKATLIAN, Modelos de política exterior y opciones estratégicas: El caso de 
América Latina frente a Estados Unidos, in «Revista CIDOB d’afers internacionals», 85-86, 2009, pp. 
211-249. 
4
 See ibid., p. 213. 
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imposing a 45% tariff on all Chinese imports and 35% on most Mexican products. At a 
fiscal level, he proposes to lower taxes. In fact, he has set tariffs of 10% on aluminum 
and 25% in steel. Some of the most affected countries are Brazil, which in the first nine 
months of 2017 represented 13% of steel imports, Mexico and Colombia.  
     Secondly, individual factors are personality and idiosyncrasy, which include the 
leadership capacity of decision-makers. Over the last years, Latin American leaders 
arose, as Hugo Chavez from Venezuela or Luis Inacio Lula Da Silva from Brazil, whose 
ability to influence has not been requested by other leaders, eventually losing 
credibility. Nowadays leadership is lacking in Latin America, even though sectorial 
leadership arise, as the one exercised by Colombia on drugs over Juan Manuel Santos’ 
government or the one sought by Ivan Duque on immigration from Venezuela.   
     Among the factors, ideas, traditions, language and other play an important role, 
which most times are linked with ideology or pragmatism of the leaders. In Colombia, 
for instance, in the government of Alvaro Uribe there was “Microphone Diplomacy”, 
exercised by diverse actors involved, directly or indirectly, in decision-making.   
     When comparing countries as Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Chile, it is observed 
that the variable change of government is important. Presidential diplomacy tends to 
impose and a style either pragmatic or ideological permeates the language and alliances. 
They are influenced by culture, value, traditions and identity. Perceptions and images 
become fundamental. This is why countries are so determined to improve their image.   
     Given the heterogeneity of the region, which presents diverse vulnerability and 
sensitivity as they differentiate in sub regions and theme agendas, Latin American 
countries respond differently to systemic and individual factors. The crisis of 
globalization is present in a different manner in all of them.    
 
3. Heterogeneity and regional fragmentation 
  
Latin America is asymmetric. It is classified in Southern Cone, Andean, Great 
Caribbean, and Mexico. Each has its particularities.  
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     First, the Southern Cone is a region of military origins which managed to transit to 
democracy by consolidating a democratic institutional tradition and governability. It is 
hence present in earlier reflections and analysis on topics as democracy, transparency, 
and institutions. However, the Southern Cone is no stranger to territorial threats as the 
differences of Chile with Bolivia and Peru, the triple border and problems between 
Chile and Argentina. Historically the sub region has seen Brazil as a giant with 
expansion pretentions. In this sense, MERCOSUR managed to create a climate of trust 
between its members. Geopolitics plays an important role as Brazil limits with 10 
countries in South American and for many years played a leadership role reflected on 
UNASUR and the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization, as multilateral bodies, and 
on the Council of South American Defense and the Initiative for the Integration of 
Regional Infrastructure of South America IIRSA. Brazil lost leadership and with the 
election of Jair Bolsonaro as president brings uncertainty to the region.  It is closer to 
the United States more than the Latin American countries. 
     Second, there is the Andean region in which two visions of the world and two ways 
to insert internationally: on the one hand, Peru and Colombia are part of the Pacific 
Alliance; and, on the other hand, the rest of the Andean countries among which we 
include Venezuela even if it withdrew from the Andean Community. In 
this region, there are leaders’ part of the Pink Wave as Nicolas Maduro, Evo Morales 
and former president Rafael Correa. There have been changes in Ecuador with the 
election of Lenin Moreno moving closer to Peru and Colombia. The identity of the 
region alters by the influence of the Caribbean, the Pacific and the Amazon, which 
reflect on the external image.   
     In Colombia, there was also a change in government. The new president Ivan Duque 
is approaching the United States within a new “pragmatic settlement” to face the 
Venezuelan crisis. Drugs is paramount in the bilateral relationship.  Colombia has had a 
pragmatic accommodation with the rest of the world. «Los cambios en la inserción 
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externa colombiana son más pragmáticos y coyunturales que estructurales, y van a 
depender del acomodamiento de quien ocupe la casa de gobierno».
5
  
     Third is the Great Caribbean, which comprises the islands as well as the continental 
part of Latin American to the Caribbean Sea: English-speaking, French-speaking and 
Spanish-speaking independent islands, overseas territories and protectorates and, also, 
Central America, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia. This composition implies, from an 
economic standpoint, the existence of a market characterized by diversity and 
heterogeneity. At a political level, the States that make the Great Caribbean have 
diverse margins of autonomy, sovereignty, political development and external relations. 
It characterizes for being the only region of the hemisphere that presents a mosaic of 
European influence, as the British, Spanish, French, Dutch and even Danish are present 
– as was the case in the 20’s with the possession of Denmark of the Virgin Islands, now 
American.  
     This variety of influences and cultures is expressed in five languages: Spanish, 
French, English, Creole and Deutch; and a variety of dialects, more than six religions: 
Catholic, Muslim, Hindu, protestant, episcopacy, vudu, among others; and several 
ethnic groups from which standout black, white and mestizo. Furthermore, there is great 
diversity of population sizes which together with economic, political and cultural 
manifestations, indicate an immense complexity.  
     History and geopolitics in the Caribbean have been impregnated by the presence of 
external powers as Great Britain, France, The Netherlands, Russia (former Soviet 
Union) or the United States, which raced, depending on the historic moment, for its 
presence and expansion towards this geographical area. Currently the interest has 
decreased.   
     Mexico’s border with the United States is 3,200 km long. It has a trade agreement 
which was renegotiated with the US and complex migratory dynamics because of 
                                                     
5
 M. ARDILA - I. CLEMENTE, Santos: Una diplomacia tradicional con cambios, in «Revista OASIS», 29, 
2019, p. 31. 
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President Trump’s immigration policy.  Mexico’s foreign policy was a result not only of 
its Revolution but also of the loss of territory during the XIX Century. It was 
characterized by defensive, isolationist and jurist traits. Its relationship with the United 
States is marked by the asymmetry of power and the logic of domination. The lack of 
trust is linked to the loss of sovereignty. Mexico losses 65% of its territory between 
1836 and 1847 and promoted a policy of “Defensive Nationalism” as was called by 
Mario Ojeda, Guadalupe Gonzalez, Lorenzo Meyer and Soledad Loaeza; and later by a 
“Pragmatism of Principle”.6 By pressure by its internal economic elites, it approached 
the United States moving from a confrontation to cooperation and settling with the 
northern neighbor.    
     International analysts have pointed that the greatest political oncoming to the United 
States was with the entering the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 
1994, and the political renovation following the triumph of Vicente Fox at the polls in 
2000, moving gradually away from South America 
7
.   
     Notwithstanding, since Donald Trump reached the White House, a questioning of the 
relationship with Mexico is present, particularly in regards to commerce and 
immigration. Further, President Manuel Lopez Obrador has shown more autonomous 
and diverse policies as a move towards Latin America.  At the end of September ended 
the negotiation of United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. Some bilateral advances 
were possible between Mexico and the United States as are the rules of origin for the car 
and textile industries, and that the US does not impose restrictions on perishables from 
Mexico. Even though the bilateral negotiation was not well received by Canada, it 
continued in the trade agreement.   
                                                     
6
 See R. VELÁSQUEZ  FLORES, “Pragmatismo principista”: la política exterior de México, in «Revista de 
Relaciones Internacionales de la UNAM», 120-121, 2015, pp. 151-164. 
7
 See R. BERNAL-MEZA, México: de la autonomista potencia media a socio subordinado de Estados 
Unidos, in «Revista Ciclos en la Historia, la Economía y la Sociedad», XVIII, 35-36, 2009, pp. 233-278; 
A. ROUQUIÉ, México y el TLCAN, veinte años después, in «Foro Internacional», LV, 2, 2015, pp. 433-453. 
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     New agreed chapters include digital commerce, labor, environment, small and 
medium enterprises, competitiveness, anticorruption, regulatory practice and 
macroeconomic policies and exchange rates. Notwithstanding, the current situation 
shows the presence of a New Right in Latin America.   
  
 
4. Latin America today and the crisis of multilateralism 
  
Three political processes mark the Latin American juncture: elections, weakening of 
regional powers, and crisis of multilateralism.  In 2018 there were presidential elections 
in seven Latin American countries: Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Paraguay, 
Cuba and Venezuela; leaving behind the tendency towards the new Latin American left 
and supporting the new right to which Argentina, Chile and Ecuador adhere.   
     From 2003 to 2015 Latin American countries have benefited from high prices of raw 
materials as petroleum, natural gas, copper, iron and aluminum. With the lowering of 
prices of petroleum and the change in the development model of China there was a 
deceleration of Latin American economies. Social politics began to decrease 
accentuating inequality in income distribution. Latin America lost an opportunity to 
reduce its vulnerability and diversify its economies.   
     From the countries holding elections, it is important to highlight 
Mexico, Brazil and Colombia, which are regional powers of different rank. 
In Mexico, the winning of Manuel Lopez Obrador with over 30 million votes gives him 
the legitimacy to make a series of changes at domestic and international levels. The 
appointments create trust among different sectors of society and for investment.  
     Besides the diversification of Mexican foreign policy, he will focus on 
multilateralism and integration, and the approach to Latin America. Within 
this emphasis, the Pacific Alliance plays an important role as will CELAC. Anyway, a 
Pragmatism of Principle, as named by Rafael Velasquez, continues to dominate in 
Mexico’s foreign policy. Manuel Lopez Obrador is seeking to diversify international 
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relations and approach Latin America.  A role as a mediator in the face of the 
Venezuelan crisis would give it legitimacy and leadership in the region. 
     In regards to Brazil, the situation is uncertain as it decides between democracy or 
authoritarianism, leadership, bilateralism or integration. Brazil has a history of 
authoritarianism and expansionism that make the rest of Latin America fear. The 
triumph of Bolsonaro creates uncertainty in the region and the fear of the return of 
authoritarianism. Most likely will strengthen the relationship with the United States and 
the new Latin American right. Its rhetoric shows profound changes that seem more 
pragmatic than real. He speaks of intervening in Venezuela. Both countries share a 
border with a length of 2,199 km. 
     In regards to Colombia, the government of Juan Manuel Santos promoted Traditional 
Diplomacy, a Pragmatic Accomodation in permanent interaction with its internal 
politics, with political and economic elites fragmented, before its mostly political 
project. Its international insertion was motivated by showing a new image of the 
country, fostering an Economic Diplomacy by attracting foreign investment, increasing 
its presence in the world and negotiating a peace deal with the support of the 
international community.  President Ivan Duque promotes a new policy oriented 
towards the United States, as demonstrated by its participation in the United Nations 
General Assembly, and presidential and ministerial meetings. Venezuela and its 
immigrants worry Colombia and is seeking international, regional and national support 
to face the over 2 million Venezuelans in the country.  
     These election processes between 2017 and 2018 portray the crisis of the Pink Wave 
and the installment of a New Right in Latin America. In 2017, Venezuela, Brazil, 
Mexico, Ecuador and Peru were the main Latin American countries to undergo the most 
profound and complex crisis linked to corruption in the high spheres of government. 
This contributed to its weakening as regional powers and the loss at elections of the 
candidate by the Partido de los Trabajadores (PT) in Brazil.   
     In Latin America primary regional powers flourished as Brazil and Mexico, and 
secondary as Chile, Argentina, Venezuela (with Chavez) and Colombia. The former 
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with greater capacity and international projection while the later used soft power. Both 
used multilateralism in their regional projection. This was Brazil’s approach 
on UNASUR, which integrated all South American countries; and Mexico with 
the Meso American project, which included Central America, Dominican Republic and 
Colombia. This was possible in the context of the weakening of the United States and 
the combination of ideology and pragmatism.
8
  According to Gardini and Lambert, five 
factors are intended to serve as tools to explore the possible sources and identify the 
possible agents of ideology and pragmatism in foreign policy: ends and purposes, means 
available, agency, process and structure. 
     Brazil and Mexico were weakened eventhiugh the first managed to ascend over 
several years. It exercised great leadership and promoted projects on infrastructure as 
IIRSA and safety as Council of South American Defense. Given its soft and hard 
capacities it surpassed Mexico and over all enjoyed great legitimacy in terms of trust 
and legitimacy. Mexico is seen too close to the United States, which weakened it as a 
regional power
9
. Later, drug trafficking, violence, corruption and inequality of income 
distribution weakened it even further.  
     On their part, secondary regional powers do Soft Balancing to the hegemonic power 
and other regional powers and compete for regional leadership. Their interests vary, and 
present convergence and divergence in regards to its international activity, capacities, 
leadership and legitimacy. The difference is based on continuity and consolidation of a 
project in terms of national interest – State Policy – as well as in its international 
activity, capacities (military expenditure, natural resources) and international image 
linked to the perception of other actors, legitimacy, leadership and the discourse, among 
others. Chile and Colombia will opt for Soft Power and Public Diplomacy to improve 
                                                     
8
 See G.L. GARDINI - P. LAMBERT, eds., Latin Americas Foreign Policy, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011. 
9
 See R. BERNAL-MEZA, México: de la autonomista potencia media a socio subordinado de Estados 
Unidos, cit., pp. 233-278. 
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their image, exercise leadership, build new partnerships and find a new balance of 
regional power.   
     Nowadays Latin America lacks leadership of a single country and what is found is 
theme leadership. The absence of leadership hinders integration and multilateralism. In 
addition, the economic crisis and the disinterest of the elites to assume the cost implied 
by leadership make difficult the improvement of hierarchy in the regional power.   
     Latin America has not overcome the crisis of multilateralism. Initially it 
was argued that multilateral organizations as OAS or CAN had been created in a very 
different context, of a cold war in which threats came from States themselves. Today 
threats are transnational and the presence of non-governmental actors makes it more 
complex. At the same time, rebellious governments wanted to build associations 
without the presence of the United States. This gave origin to UNASUR, CELAC and 
ALBA.   
     In this sense, liberal and post-liberal models from the Atlantic and the Pacific took 
form and made evident breaks in Latin American integration. At the same time, 
countries lack continuous State policies on integration, which leads to giving a special 
meaning to variables as changes in government. The withdrawal of Ecuador from ALBA 
and its interest in signing the Pacific Alliance is a good example. Both ALBA and 
UNASUR are in even greater crisis and in disintegrating processes.  On the other hand, 
the lack of leadership and regional powers committed with integration difficult their 
viability. There are integrationist discourses but sovereignty is determinant. Behind it is 
the role of State and society.   
     In this sense, regionalism is undergoing a transition and uncertainty in which two 
countries, Brazil and Mexico, are hesitant in their performance and in regards to 
integration. Most likely Manuel Lopez Obrador will approach Latin American 
multilateralism in a certainly pragmatic way remaining in the Pacific Alliance in which 
Mexico has shown results. At the end, it has a tradition in that region as member of 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Transpacific Partnership (TPP), and 
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having 16 deep ports on the Mexican pacific. Mexico had an early insertion in Asia-
Pacific.   
     Given these two considerations, there is a need to search for other mechanism and 
actors to revitalize integration as the participation of non-governmental actors or 
association of regional groups as Pacific-Alliance – Mercosur.   
 
5. Mechanisms and actors 
Zeraoui defines Paradiplomacy as an activity reserved for intermediate governments, 
provinces or municipalities and not for private institutions:
10
 «[…] Es exclusiva del 
poder político federal y no de entidades privadas, la paradiplomacia es una actividad 
reservada a los gobiernos intermedios, provincias o municipalidades y no a las 
instituciones privadas. Las universidades o las empresas privadas pueden tener 
actividades internacionales o relaciones internacionales, pero diferenciadas de la 
diplomacia o la para-diplomacia».
11
 
     They are the relationships of non-central governments with cultural, commercial and 
industrial centers of other States, including the relationship with the governments of 
foreign States. In this sense, non-central governments seek to institute international 
relations through the establishment of formal and informal contacts, permanent or ad-
hoc with foreign entities, either public or private, with the purpose of promoting socio-
economic, political or cultural matters, as well as any other external dimension of their 
constitutional competences.
12
 Paradiplomacy of the regions is the same as of the cities 
even though it has had an economicist character of the “city brand”. None the less, there 
is internationalization actions that include other areas as culture or society. In country 
branding there are cities, which have a particular identity and perception of the 
                                                     
10
 See Z. ZERAOUI, Para entender la paradiplomacia, in «Desafíos», XXVIII, 1, enero-junio, 2016, pp. 
15-34. 
11
 Ibid., p. 16.  
12
 N. CORNAGO, Exploring the Global Dimensions of Paradiplomacy: Functional and Normative 
Dynamics in the Global Spreading of Subnational Involvement in Foreign Affairs, in «Foreign Relations 
of Constituent Units». Forum of Federations/Forum des Fédérations, Ottawa, 2001, http://www.ciff.on.ca 
(accessed 20/06/02). 
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international community. As pointed by Zidane and Rey (2016), Curitiva in Brazil is 
known for urban planning and environmental management; The Hague in The 
Netherlands is known for hosting organizations of legal and judicial topics as the 
International Criminal Court, part of the UN system; and Geneve in Switzerland is 
known as host of multilateral organizations as the International Red Cross. At the level 
of Latin American integration groups, the experience of the participation of cities in 
MERCOSUR is the most novel, institutionalized and permanent. Mercociudades is the 
main Network of South American Local Governments. It was funded in 1995 by 
initiative of the main mayors and prefects of the region. The objective is the 
participation of local governments in the process of regional integration, promoting the 
creation of an institutional scope for the cities of Mercosur and developing exchange 
and horizontal cooperation between local governments of the region.
13
 Its objectives 
have favored cooperation, tourism, exchange of product information, conflict resolution, 
among others.  
     The Andean Community by Decree 586 in 2003 created the Andean Network of 
Cities as a consultative institution of the Andean Integration System, which included 
over 30 cities. It aimed at strengthening cities as actors of integration. This council is 
integrated by 3 representatives of each country, one of which is the metropolitan mayor 
of the city hosting the government of the Member State, and the other two will be 
elected between the mayors of the Network of Andean Cities. The commitment is the 
promotion of the Andean integration process. The Minister of Foreign Affairs in their 
country must accredit these representatives.   
     Later, in 2007, there was a cooperation agreement between the Andean Network of 
Cities and the Network of Mercociudades. It wanted to promote and strengthen the 
mechanisms of communication between cities and their associations to debate on the 
realities of South American cities and move forward on common actions for local 
democracy. However, the crisis in the Andean Community hindered its projection. The 
lack of legitimacy generates distrust on local leadership in cities and regions.   
                                                     
13
 See www.mercociudades.org/node/2250 (accessed 15/01/2019). 
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     Looking at the associations of regional groups, Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance are 
part of a strategic inter-regionalism with strategic elements. Strategic regionalism is a 
process resulting from an Alliance between Nation-States and transnational firms or 
national businesses, which have, began a process of internationalization of their 
economic activities. Its origins are found in the strategic commercial politics, an 
accepted modality in the new theory of international trade to describe in part the 
functioning of certain oligopolistic markets. However, it is not only economic and 
commercial rationale but politics that result fundamental to broaden the conception of 
strategic regionalism where a country is leader (or a leading axis) that promotes through 
regional integration conditions and a favorable legal framework for the expansion of 
activities of ETN. We are referring to the association between regional groups and 
organisms. We may confirm that it is part of a New Multilateralism and of the search of 
new regional associations, which characterizes by its flexibility, variety of actors, low 
costs, and the possibility to serve as bridge to Asia.  
     The Pacific Alliance and Mercosur present convergences linked to the geographic 
location, soft balancing to ALBA, the search for greater margins of autonomy, and 
capacities. The participation of countries as Mexico and Brazil as primary regional 
powers, and of Chile, Argentina and Colombia as secondary strengthen the position to 
face the United States and Trump’s protectionism and hence cooperate on topics as 
immigration of Venezuelans.  
     The association of both groups empowers its geostrategic as Andean countries, with 
exit to the Pacific and territories in the Amazon with great environmental resources. It is 
also strategic because of the growth of the economies of China, India, Japan and Korea; 
and as the countries with greater investment from China and India in Latin America.  
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6. Conclusions 
  
Latin America is fragmented and integration and multilateralism are difficult. It is 
oriented towards a New Right and a pragmatic accommodation with the United States. 
Countries lack a “Grand Strategy”. Latin American changes are more conjunctural than 
structural, depending on presidential preferences. Uncertainty and transition are at the 
core of Latin America due to the presidency of Donald Trump in the United States. 
Latin America is diverse and shows differences within and outside the region but within 
each country. The current conjuncture and its new heads of state deepen uncertainty 
showing a new more pragmatic and less ideological right. Recovery and ascent of 
countries as Brazil and Mexico will take its time and even more Latin American 
integration and multilateralism. 
     The orientation of foreign policy in Latin America is influenced by internal, external 
and personal elements. At the same time, foreign policy is more pragmatic than 
ideological However, Presidential diplomacy continues to be important in all Latin 
American countries.  
The absence of leadership hinders integration and multilateralism. In this sense, it is 
necessary to advance towards integration and theme leadership in Strategic 
Interregionalism: Pacific Alliance – MERCOSUR and in the internationalization of 
subnational governments.  
     Regional differences continue to be observed between Mexico, Central America and 
South America even though UNASUR weakens South America as a politically built 
region and with a leadership as the one exercised by Brazil for years. However, the 
crisis in Brazil weakened this region and the possibility of association. Latin American 
is a fragmented region with diverse vulnerabilities and political and economic 
developments.  
     Latin America is going through political and economic transformations. The rise of 
the left government came to end. A tendency towards the right is observed, changing the 
Latin American political map. Of the twenty countries, during 2018 a third of these held 
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presidential elections. Colombia, Paraguay and Peru remained to the right, while Costa 
Rica and Venezuela remain on the left. The most radical change was in Brazil and 
Mexico, where the first turned to the right and the second to the left. The map could 
continue to change in 2019, as elections are expected in Argentina, Bolivia, Guatemala, 
Panama and Uruguay. The left will seek to stay in Bolivia and Uruguay while the right 
will do the same in Argentina, Panama and Guatemala. 
     The crisis in Venezuela and the arrival to power of Jair Bolsonaro focus attention on 
Latin America and its loss of relative autonomy on its international relations. These two 
cases force us to reflect seriously on something that seems distant and typical of the 
phase of democratic transition in the region: the military issue and its role in the 
institutions. We observe the resurgence of the neoliberal project with features of 
fragility as it is based on fragmented and polarized societies and is produced under 
much primaries economy. These hegemonic projects cannot be definitively consolidated 
because a large part of society does not accept them. 
     In addition to the elections to be held in 2019, the first year of Ivan Duque in 
Colombia is another aspect to be considered, as the future of the Peace Agreement 
agreed with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the negotiation 
process is still uncertain. With the National Liberation Army (ELN) was interrupted. 
Regarding the first, land rights issues and the financing of programs for reparation to 
victims are still pending. As for the resumption of talks with the ELN, the government 
has made it a condition that the kidnappings and all criminal activity cease. Likewise, 
faced with the security crisis stemming from the Venezuelan migration, the Colombian 
Government has hardened its position before the Government of President Nicolas 
Maduro. Derived from the exodus of nearly two million Venezuelans to Colombia, the 
effects of the border crisis with Venezuela will increase internal tension, given that even 
if Maduro left the government in 2019, an unstable situation would continue. Colombia 
has been the country that has received the most migrants. Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and 
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Panama are also dealing with the consequences of mass displacement. In turn, Colombia 
has assumed leadership in the Lima Group.  
     This year the position against Maduro has hardened, sanctions and diplomatic 
isolation are greater. Juan Guaidó proclaimed himself interim president. It was decided 
to prevent Venezuelan officials from entering Colombia and block financial and 
banking operations of persons identified as part of the regime; restrict the granting of 
international credits from competent bodies; suspend military cooperation; and to urge 
other States to support the request submitted to the International Criminal Court to 
investigate the possible commission of crimes against humanity. However, on January 
10 President Maduro took possession of his second presidential term during which he 
will inevitably continue to collide with his neighbors in the region. The clash is 
expected in particular with Brazil, given that President Jair Bolsonaro has called on all 
countries of the world to unite to "liberate" Venezuela. Similarly, attention should be 
paid to the increase in military cooperation with Russia, one of the largest owners of oil 
fields in Venezuela.  
     China and Russia will seek to consolidate a greater presence in the region. Given 
that, China will play an important role in Latin American geopolitics, in recent years. 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Panama and El Salvador form the allied group of 
Peking in the Central American Integration System (SICA). For Russia, Latin America 
has left the secondary place it occupied in the past and has become an important partner. 
Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela are a constant in the relations with this country. The 
Pacific Alliance will continue to consolidate as a platform for regional integration. 
Within the framework of this mechanism, Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Peru will 
continue advancing in the negotiation process of free trade agreements with Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and Singapore, with a view to their becoming Associated States. 
On the other hand, the Free Trade Agreement between the Common Market of the 
South (MERCOSUR) and the European Union is at a crucial moment after 20 years of 
negotiations. Beyond the technical obstacles that have not allowed the parties to reach 
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an agreement, the position taken by the governments of Argentina and Brazil will be 
decisive on the future of this agreement.  
     Latin America is going through a transition at the bilateral and multilateral levels. 
His foreign policy seems to be more ideological than pragmatic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
